

Abortion and American Politics: Can a single policy issue lead to party switching?

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ABSTRACT

There are many controversial social issues that continue to influence and impact American politics, but there are few issues that are as divisive as abortion. Ever since the Supreme Court's ground breaking decision in the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* case, which ruled that the Constitution protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, the issue of abortion has continued to be a prominent and hotly debated social and policy issue. Unlike other policy issues, abortion is easily understood by the voting public, and due to the emotional nature of the issue, abortion continues to shape American politics and cut party lines, most notably seen during the 1992 Presidential Election.

Although the extent to which abortion impacted the 1992 Presidential election is debated among scholars, the data and evidence in this paper indicate that abortion did play a role in the election and its outcome. Therefore, the election of President Clinton had profound long-term political, social, and legal ramifications, as Clinton was able to secure the Constitutional protections of abortion in *Roe* by appointing two pro-choice Supreme Court Justices to fill vacated seats, and had former President Bush won, he hypothetically would have been able to appoint two pro-life Justices which could have significantly altered the political make-up of the Supreme Court, and potentially could have ultimately resulted in the Court reversing *Roe*. When comparing and contrasting abortion NES election data from 1992 to 2004 and 2006 SPSS data, there are strong relationships between voter knowledge, concern over abortion, and abortion saliency, as the more knowledgeable and concerned a voter is over abortion, the more likely they will be abortion salient.

INTRODUCTION

There are many controversial social issues that continue to influence and impact American politics, but there are few issues that are as divisive as abortion. Ever since the Supreme Court's ground breaking decision in the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* case, which ruled that the Constitution protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, the issue of abortion has continued to be a prominent and fiercely debated social and policy issue. Less than 1% of respondents in the 1992 American National Election Study were unaware or unwilling to offer an opinion on the issue of abortion (Abramowitz 1995, 176). Referring to Appendix 1a, currently 46% of voters say abortion should be legal, while 43% of men believe abortion should be legal in most or all cases compared with 49% of women (Pew Research Center 2009, 1). Just 40% of men older than 50 say abortion should be legal in most or all cases, while 45% of women older than 50 say abortion should be legal in most or all cases (Pew Research Center 2009, 1).

Unlike other policy issues, abortion is easily understood by the voting public, and due to the emotional nature of the issue, abortion continues to shape American politics and cut along party lines, most notably seen during the 1992 Presidential Election. While most policy issues are addressed through the Congressional branch of government, abortion policy is shaped through Supreme Court rulings and the White House. The decision in *Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania* (1992) served as a catalyst event which forced pro-choice advocates to mobilize in order to get pro-choice supporter Bill Clinton elected as President in the 1992 election. This proved to be extremely effective as Clinton during his Presidency was able to appoint two pro-choice Supreme Court Justices, and had he not won, former President H.W. Bush could have appointed two additional pro-life Justices as he had previously done during his first term as President. The Court in 1992 was already extremely divided over abortion, as indicated in the 5-4 decisions in both *Webster*

and *Casey*, and had Bush won the 1992 election and appointed two pro-life Justices to the bench, it could have dramatically changed the makeup of the court, and more importantly, it could have changed the court's interpretation of the Constitutional protections for abortion which were established in *Roe v. Wade*.

While today the majority of voter's views on abortion aligns with their political party's platform on abortion, the issue has had a profound impact on politics and political party platforms, most notably in the 1992 Presidential Election, which forced both Democratic and Republican party members to either fall in line with their party's abortion platform, or defect to another party whose platform aligns with their views, which ultimately allowed Bill Clinton to win the Presidency and further shape abortion policy in the United States.

Research Questions

- a. How have Supreme Court decisions on the issue of abortion impacted politics and voting behavior? Specifically, how profound of an impact did the 1989 Supreme Court decision of *Webster v. Reproductive Services* have on the 1992 Presidential Election?
- b. If an individual voter's political party platform does not align with their own personal views of abortion, then will that voter defect to another party whose platform aligns with their personal views on abortion? And would they have even joined the party whose platform does not align with their personal views on abortion?
- c. Did Republican party defections over the issue of abortion in the 1992 Pres Election have a profound impact on the results of the election? Or, were there defections among both major political parties, which had no serious impact on the election as Abramowitz argues?
- d. How directly correlated is a person's view on abortion to their political party? Has this changed over time?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Roe v. Wade 1973- Introduction

Throughout the history of abortion in the United States, the Supreme Court has played a dominating role in shaping both federal and state abortion policy, while determining how much authority states have to regulate abortions. While abortion is a significant political and social issue, abortion policy has primarily been shaped not through Congress, but through Supreme Court rulings, most notably, the 1973 decision in *Roe v. Wade* which overruled a Texas statute which made abortion a crime unless the mother's life was in danger, and proved to be a major policy focusing event which gained increased public attention as a significant policy issue.

The Fourteenth Amendment- The Right to Privacy

Delivering the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun articulated the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as it relates to abortion rights. "This right to privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action...the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" (Shapiro 1995, 60). Blackmun, cognizant of both the woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, and the state's interest to regulate the health of both the mother and the unborn baby, concluded "that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interest in regulation" (Shapiro 1995, 60). Therefore, Blackmun on behalf of the court established a trimester framework, in order to

balance the self-interests of the mother, as well as the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother and unborn baby.

Establishment of Trimesters

By framing abortion through the establishment of trimesters, Blackmun and the majority of the court indicated that the “compelling” point for state intervention, based on medical knowledge at the time, was at the end of the first trimester (Shapiro 1995, 66). “This means...that prior to this “compelling” point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State” (Shapiro 1995, 67). Therefore, the precedent which established Trimesters attempted to balance the right of the mother to terminate her pregnancy within an appropriate period of time (the first trimester), while accounting for the State's interests in protecting the health of the mother and the child.

Defining a “person”

In an attempt to restrict abortions, early pro-life advocates and several states during the 1970s attempted to restrict abortion on the basis that the unborn baby was still a person, and thus entitled to constitutional protections, such as the Right to Privacy which is articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Blackmun, along with the majority of the court sought to dissolve such a defense by establishing precedent on what was considered a “person.”

The Constitution does not define “person” in so many words...But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only *postnatally*. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application...All this, together with our observation, *supra*, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word “person,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn (Shapiro 1995, 67).

When does life start?

The Court was also faced with the difficult decision to decide when life actually started. The Texas statute stated life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, therefore, the state has a compelling interest to protect that life at and after conception. The Court struggled to legally determine when life actually began, so Blackmun and the Court concluded that “we need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer” (Shapiro 1995, 64). The Court ultimately left this fiercely contested issue alone, deciding to defer such a decision to a later court.

Congressional Reaction to Roe v. Wade

While the Court’s decision in *Roe v. Wade* was seen as a monumental verdict for pro-choice advocates which allowed women to have the freedom to decide if they want to keep their baby or not, many Senators and Congressman, especially religious Southern members, publically expressed their disappointment of the Court’s ruling, and more importantly, that the Court effectively created policy through its ruling, a job which is primarily vested upon the Congressional branch of government, not the Judiciary. Senator James B. Allen (Alabama) on January 23, 1973 remarked:

Mr. President, I am shocked at the ruling of the Supreme Court legalizing abortions, and I believe this decision is bad logic, bad law, and bad morals. It strikes down the laws in some 31 states and will require rewriting of the laws of all states except Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington to conform to the decision. The Supreme Court is up to its old falling of permissiveness and of taking over the legislative functions of the Congress and of the State legislatures (Rubin 1994, 152).

The Court's ruling instantly made abortion a major political issue in political elections and at every level of government. "By 1976 it had even become a campaign issue in the presidential election. The political parties took stands on abortion in their platforms" (Rubin 1994, 219).

Public Reaction to Roe v. Wade

The Supreme Court could have never imagined the impact their ruling in *Roe v. Wade* would have on political elections and interest group involvement. Shortly after the court's decision "in the congressional election in the fall of 1974 anti-abortion forces tried to identify and defeat congressmen who supported abortion rights. This tactic, only moderately successful in 1974, was used more effectively in succeeding elections, frightening members of Congress who might have otherwise have agreed with the Court's decision" (Rubin 1994, 152). One of the largest pro-life interest groups to form a political action campaign was the National Conference of Catholic Bishops which "decided to get into politics in earnest to fight against abortion and launched a political action campaign that called for the organization of right-to-life units in all of the thousand of Catholic parishes across the country. One of their objectives would be the defeat of pro-abortion officials in the next round of elections" (Rubin 1994, 171). Furthermore, from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, "pro-life partisans mounted a public relations campaign to convince the public that fetuses being aborted feel pain; using a sonogram of an actual abortion....In another new development, anti-abortionists who were frustrated by the failure of the political system to outlaw abortion began to use direct action tactics and civil disobedience to demonstrate their impatience and outrage" (Rubin 1994, 234). Once people started to turn violent by bombing abortion clinics or killing doctors who performed abortions, the radical pro-life supporters attempted to forcefully prevent abortions, however, the media coverage made abortion a more relevant, visible issue, which further shaped public perception.

While pro-life forces enjoyed a greater level of political participation and action compared to pro-choice supporters, during the 1980s and early 1990s, “pro-choice groups, increasingly well-organized and well-financed used sophisticated campaign techniques to target anti-abortion officials running for public office...The political advantage that pro-life organizations enjoyed during the early part of the decade was no longer unchallenged” (Rubin 1994, 235).

As pro-choice and pro-life interest groups and political action groups began to formulate their political strategy to secure their abortion interests on the state and federal level, public pressure from anti-abortion groups can be seen evidently through Congresses reaction to the Roe ruling, as members of Congress tried to pass over 50 proposals during the first session of the 94th Congress (1974-75) to amend the Constitution to override the Court’s ruling (Rubin 1994, 152). While Congress had little authority to regulate abortion besides stripping federal funding for abortions, State legislatures became the target for anti-abortion groups.

State legislatures went back to the drawing board to revise state abortion laws in line with the new legal rules. In those states where there was strong political opposition to abortion, the legislators tried to find ways to restrict abortion within the framework set out in Roe. As they tested the limits of the decision, some states passed laws that later would be found unconstitutional (Rubin 1994, 171).

In the subsequent years, as states began passing more restrictive laws on abortion it set the stage for future Supreme Court intervention, most notably seen in the 1989 case of *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*. This is important, because as discussed earlier, abortion policy is shaped not through Congress, but through Supreme Court rulings, which ultimately dictate how much power and autonomy states have over abortion and access.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989)

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation which placed several restrictions on abortion, and its preamble statute indicated that life begins at conception, and therefore, among

other things, the bill prevented public facilities and public employees from participating in abortions, although it did not affect private doctor's offices or clinics. In a 5 to 4 decision, the majority of the Court did not overturn *Roe v Wade*, however, the opinion of the court made it clear that it would apply a "less stringent standard of review to state regulations on abortion." Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion argued that it "appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion law, constructed overnight in *Roe v. Wade*, must be disassembled door-jamb by door-jamb, and never entirely brought down, no matter how wrong it may be" (Rubin 1994, 261). Essentially, while Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's sweeping ruling in *Roe*, she was cognizant of the importance of established precedent in the common law legal system of the United States, which serves as the authority for future rulings.

While Justice O'Connor questioned the likelihood that *Roe* would ever be overturned completely, the Court in *Webster* made it clear that "state legislatures have considerable discretion to pass restrictive legislation in the future, with the likelihood that such laws would probably pass constitutional muster" (Lewis and Shimabukuro 2005, 3). Therefore, the Court's ruling, as articulated by Justice O'Connor, provided means to incrementally "disassemble" the ruling in *Roe* by restricting abortion access and funding, which would severely weaken and limit the power of *Roe*. Justice Blackmun, writing the dissent of the Court articulated:

Although today, no less than yesterday, the Constitution and the decisions of this Court prohibit a State from enacting laws that inhibit women from the meaningful exercise of that right, a plurality of this Court implicitly invites every state legislature to enact more and more restrictive abortion regulations in order to provoke more and more test cases, in the hope that sometime down the line the Court will return the laws of procreative freedom to the severe limitations that generally prevailed in this country before January 22, 1973. Never in my memory has a plurality announced a judgment of this Court that so foments disregard for the law and for our standing decisions (Shapiro 1995, 186).

Justice Blackmun, who previously wrote the majority opinion in *Roe v. Wade*, argued that although the Court's ruling did not overturn the landmark decision in *Roe*, the new opinion in *Webster* essentially invited state legislatures to pass legislative restrictions on abortion which would continue

to test the court's initial interpretation of Roe and the constitutional protections of abortion. "It significance derives more from the rationales articulated by the five justices regarding how abortion restriction would be reviewed in the future. However, because the Missouri law did not limit abortion prior to viability, the plurality did not believe it was necessary to consider overruling Roe" (Lewis and Shimabukuro 2005, 4). Therefore, Webster provided state legislatures more autonomy with their state abortion laws to restrict abortion funding and access, and thus jeopardized the future vitality of Roe.

The Court's ruling in Webster sent a shock wave throughout the nation, and had several long-term ramifications, both legally and politically. The decision forced pro-choice advocates to mobilize and reframe their message in order to effectuate upcoming state and national elections, in an effort to preserve Roe shortly before the 1992 presidential election. "The financial and organizational advantages held by the pro-choice faction after the Webster decision enabled them to gain power over the pro-life faction. The pro-choice movement focused a great deal of effort and money on the 1989 gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia and succeeded in electing pro-choice candidates in both states" (Swedish 2001, 16). Now as a more sophisticated and equipped interest group, the pro-choice movement successfully targeted key battle ground state elections where abortion rights and access were threatened.

Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania (1992)

In 1988 and 1989 the Pennsylvania state legislature established new laws which required consent for minors seeking abortion, a 24-hour waiting period prior to an abortion, and the requirement for married women to notify her husband about her decision to have an abortion. These new laws were subsequently challenged by physicians and abortion clinics over the constitutionality of the new laws, which some argued infringed on the constitutional protections

established in *Roe*. “In a highly fractionated 5-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed the basic constitutional right to an abortion while simultaneously allowing some new restrictions...The Court refused to overrule *Roe v. Wade*, and the plurality explained at length why it was important to follow precedent” (Lewis and Shimabukuro 2005, 4). In the opinion of the Court, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter further asserted the importance of following precedent:

The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. We recognize that no judicial system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it...Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable (Shapiro 1994, 215).

Just as Justice O’Connor clearly articulated the respect for precedent in her opinion of the Court in *Webster*, the opinion of the Court again in *Casey*, reiterated the importance of established precedent in *Roe*. While the Justices may have personally disagreed with abortion, their job as a Justice is to interpret the laws of the Constitution and rule on issues according to precedent and the written laws of the United States.

Republican presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had promised to appoint new Supreme Court justices who would “oppose abortion rights had resulted in the selection of five new conservative members of the Court, all personally opposed to abortion. But in spite of Republican efforts to pack the Court with opponents of abortion, three of the new justices showed themselves unwilling to overrule *Roe v. Wade*, a decision that had been accepted law for nineteen years” (Rubin 1994, 234).

The surprising result and fragmentation of the high bench raised questions about whether the controlling plurality of Reagan and Bush appointees- O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter- had tailored their opinion to the (public opinion) polls in a calculated move to deflate the controversy prior to the 1992 presidential election or, alternatively, whether it was merely coincidental that they came down about where the polls did...Regardless, the White House advisers were relieved that *Roe* was not reversed. They had feared a possible backlash from women and young Republicans that might cost the election...*Casey* represented the kind of political compromise within the Court that was destined neither to please activists on either side nor to lay the controversy to rest (Craig 1992, 328).

Therefore, while this ruling further angered strong pro-life advocates who had invested significant time and money in order to help elect pro-life presidents such as Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Craig argues that the decision made abortion relevant, but the ruling was not enough to create serious controversy or public uproar, which could have affected Bush's support from pro-choice women and younger GOP voters.

The Court's ruling restructured the trimester framework established in *Roe*, and the majority adopted a new analysis of "undue burden." The Court articulated an undue burden as when states establish regulations and laws in which place obstacles in a woman's path to prevent her from having an abortion. "And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing substantial obstacles in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends...In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden" (Shapiro 1994, 221). By preventing states from restricting access to abortion, "the Casey decision shifted attention to the federal government as it established that the Supreme Court was the only body with the power to make abortion illegal" (Swedish 2001, 18). Therefore, just before the 1992 presidential election, pro-choice advocates changed their tactics and instead of targeting congressional and gubernatorial elections which failed to yield significant long-term results in terms of pro-choice policy and access, pro-choice advocates instead strategically targeted the 1992 presidential election in order to elect a friendly candidate who would appoint pro-choice Supreme Court justices, and who would preserve access to abortions free from state intervention.

The Court's decision in *Casey* was significant for two reasons. First, based on the new standard of review established by the majority in *Casey*, the court ruled that the state's interest in protecting the health and safety of the mother and her unborn child extended throughout the course

of pregnancy, instead of the original trimester framework established in Roe, which prevented state intervention until after the first trimester.

Second, the 1992 decision in Casey drew strong criticism from pro-choice advocates who viewed the court's new ruling as a serious threat to a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy via abortion as constitutionally established in Roe. Therefore, pro-choice advocates mobilized their resources for the 1992 Presidential Campaign and re-framed their message by "proclaiming that the Court was one vote away from reversing Roe, (pro-choice) organizations worked closely to ensure the election of pro-choice Democrat Bill Clinton as president" (Segers and Byrnes 1995, 226). Although at the time the Court's decision in Casey was seen as a serious threat to the long-term constitutional protections of abortion precedent established in Roe, the decision served as a catalyst event, as pro-choice organizations unified and mobilized during the presidential election of 1992. With Clinton's election victory, the pro-choice grass-roots mobilization succeeded by preserving constitutional protections of a woman's choice dictated in Roe, as Clinton eventually appointed two pro-choice friendly Supreme Court justices, as well as Executive orders and legislation to preserve access to abortions. Had former President H.W. Bush won the election, he likely would have been able to appoint two pro-life justices to the Court, which could have dramatically altered the Court and its future rulings on abortion.

The Clinton Administration and Abortion Policy

In 1992, at the height of the "abortion wars," the primary issue of focus for the pro-choice movement was to preserve access to abortion, one of newly elected President Bill Clinton's priorities. Referring to Appendix 2a, Clinton earned 43% of the popular vote and over 68% of the electorate vote therefore claiming the presidency, and enabling President Clinton to alter the make-

up of the Supreme Court to be more pro-choice friendly, while quickly establishing abortion access and protection laws through legislation and Executive orders.

The end of the Republican Reagan-Bush era marks, among other things, the end of one of the many stages in the decades old controversy over legal abortion. After the 1992 election, during which President Clinton received unanimous backing of legal abortion advocates while former President Bush claimed the almost unanimous support of the organized opposition to legal abortion, the recriminalization of abortion, the mirror-image “right to life” goal and “pro-choice” fear, already seemed a phrase of the past (Segers and Byrnes 1995, 205).

Immediately following his inauguration in January of 1993, President Clinton signed several Executive orders which reversed restrictive abortion policies from the Reagan and Bush administrations. This was important because Clinton had actively campaigned as a pro-choice candidate, and openly welcomed the support from pro-choice advocates, which turned out in large numbers to support him on Election Day. “(Clinton) reversed the ban on abortion counseling in federally funded family planning clinics; overturned the moratorium on federally funded research involving the use of fetal tissue; ordered a study of the current ban on the French abortion pill for personal use; and revoked the prohibition on abortions in military hospitals” (Segers and Byrnes 1995, 231). While Clinton’s Executive orders showed his pro-choice supporters that he was serious about protecting access and availability of abortions by passing five executive orders he campaigned on, Executive orders are only binding during the duration of one’s presidency and can be rescinded any time after. Therefore, Clinton’s most supportive pro-choice actions were not in Executive orders, rather in his two Supreme Court appointments, which had long standing effects on the structure of the Court and its future interpretations of the constitutional protections of abortion established through Roe.

Clinton’s first Supreme Court appointment was in 1993 when he appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who had a strong record on women’s issues and was a firm abortion rights advocate (Segers and Byrnes 1995, 232). A year later, President Clinton appointed another pro-choice

supporter, Stephen G. Breyer to fill the seat vacated by Justice Blackmun, who was one of the pro-choice movement's main judicial abortion advocates, having written the majority opinion of the Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade*. Clinton's two judicial appointments further proved his commitment to preserving access and availability of abortions, while maintaining his campaign promise that he would appoint justices who shared his support for the decision *Roe v. Wade* (Sergers and Byrnes 1995, 232).

What emerges from this review is how important the White House is to abortion politics and policy. The shift from the Bush presidency to the Clinton administration improved considerably the chances of pro-choice advocates to see their proposals enacted into law. Having a pro-choice president matters- in Supreme Court appointments, on the importation of the French birth control pill, in clinic protection laws, and on federal directives to state on Medicaid coverage of poor women's abortions (Sergers and Byrnes 1995, 242).

Overall, the momentum originated in the Casey decision helped reenergize the pro-choice movement to mount a full scale effort to preserve the decision in Roe by electing a candidate who would support Roe and protect access to abortions. The election of Bill Clinton not only shaped abortion policy for the short-term but had long standing effects, especially on the makeup of the Supreme Court, which lies at the core of abortion policy in the United States.

Since Congress has restricted legislative power and funding for abortion within the framework of Roe, the primary legal and policy mechanism to change abortion law changes is vested upon the Supreme Court, whose rulings dictate both state and federal abortion policy. Before Clinton was elected President, the high Court was distinctly split on the issue of abortion, as prominently seen in the 5-4 decisions in both Webster and Casey. The mobilization of the pro-choice movement prior to the 1992 presidential election proved to be a critical moment for abortion advocates.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Issue Evolution of Abortion after Roe v. Wade

The issue of abortion has evolved extensively since the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in *Roe v. Wade*, and has become a significant social and political issue which has impacted every level of government, therefore making it a fascinating issue to study and explore.

Adams (1997) chronicles the "issue evolution" of abortion from one pitting well-educated and more secular-citizens against those with less education and more religiously to one that divided partisans...Pro-life and pro-choice activists (during the 1980s and 1990s) used party nominations and elections to replace abortion moderates with candidates who held more extreme positions. Over time, the voting behavior of members of Congress diverged on abortion along party lines, and subsequently the correlation between partisanship and abortion attitudes began to rise in the general public (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 562).

The correlation between partisanship and abortion attitudes is further supported by data collected in the General Social Survey, which indicates that over the 1970s, the correlation between abortion attitudes and partisanship was 0.07, while in 2004 it was -0.24. Killian and Wilcox's results suggest that "as political elites polarized on the abortion issue starting in the mid-1980s and continuing through the 1990s, the mass public began to pick up on this divergence and started switching political parties...(the decision in) *Casey*, signaled to pro-life forces that changes in Supreme Court personnel would be needed to reverse *Roe*, but it also reminded pro-choice activists that *Roe* was endangered" (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 565). Therefore, Gallup polling data from the 1980s indicates: "attitudes gradually shifted toward the pro-choice position, so that by 1990, the liberal extreme outnumbered the conservative extreme by a more than two-to-one margin, This trend peaked in June 1992, with 34% saying abortion should be legal in all cases and only 13% saying it should be completely banned" (Saad 2002, 1).

Case Study Analysis: Abortion and the 1992 President Election

Alan Abramowitz in his case study titled “It’s Abortion Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election,” examined policy based voting on abortion, which he hypothesized had a profound impact on the 1992 election. Based on evidence uncovered in (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1993a, 1993b) “analysis of exit poll data from 10 gubernatorial elections that took place after the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision permitting greater state regulation of access to abortion (*Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*), they found that abortion had a greater impact on vote choice than state economic conditions in eight of ten states and abortion was a stronger predictor than even partisanship in Pennsylvania” (Abramowitz 1995, 177). Based on their findings which suggest that abortion impacted state gubernatorial elections and results, Abramowitz aimed to explore abortion’s impact on partisanship and presidential choice on a national level in the 1992 presidential election.

Respondents in the 1992 National Election Study who reported voting in the presidential election “were slightly more liberal- 49% opposed any restrictions on abortion; 15% favored allowing abortion if a “clear need” existed; 27% favored allowing abortion only in cases of rape, incest or danger to the mother’s life; and only 9% opposed abortion under any circumstances” (Abramowitz 1995, 178). Interestingly, the polling results suggest that the majority of the country in 1992 rejected the extreme pro-life position taken by the GOP and President Bush (Appendix 1b), as nearly 65% favored at least some form of legal abortions, while only 9% completely opposed abortions under any circumstance. Based on data collected in Appendix 1c, “the results indicate the strong potential for partisan defection over abortion, particularly among Republicans, 54% of whom were on the opposite side of the issue from their party’s candidate. Even among Democrats, however, a sizeable minority of voters 31% took a position that clearly conflicted with that of their

party and its presidential candidate” (Abramowitz 1995, 178). These numbers are important, as they allow us to understand the public perception of abortion within the political party structure.

As the initial results in Appendix 1c signify the potential for party defections for both political parties, Appendix 2c shows the relationship between abortion policy preference and presidential vote among all voters. Abramowitz asserts: “abortion attitudes had little or no impact on Democrats. In fact, Clinton received his strongest support, 88% of the vote, among the small group of Democrats who favored a complete ban on abortion. In contrast, support for Bush was substantially higher among Republicans who favored a ban on abortion (65%). Altogether, pro-choice defectors constituted 17% of all Republican voters in 1992 whereas pro-life defections constituted only 6% of all Democratic voters” (Abramowitz 1995, 179). In order to understand why abortion attitudes had a stronger impact among Republicans than among Democrats, Abramowitz used 1992 NES election data (Appendix 3c) to “show the level of awareness of party differences on abortion and the salience of abortion among various groups of voters. Voters were classified as knowledgeable if they placed Bush on the pro-life side of the abortion issue and Clinton on the pro-choice side. They were classified as concerned about abortion if they mentioned abortion at least once in response to the open-ended questions concerning national problems, party differences, and likes and dislikes about the parties and candidates” (Abramowitz 1995, 180). Although the issue of abortion polarized political parties and their platforms since the 1980s, only 59% of the voting public actually knew the candidates’ abortion positions.

Among the various results in Appendix 3c, 60% of all whites knew the candidates’ abortion positions, while nearly half of them, 26% considered themselves to also be abortion salient, compared to only 49% of blacks who knew the candidates’ positions, and 8% who considered themselves abortion salient. The data further “indicates that abortion was a more salient issue

among Republicans than among Democrats. Almost one third (31%) of Republican voters mentioned abortion at least once in response to the open-ended question compared with fewer than one fifth (18%) of Democratic voters. This difference was largely a by-product of racial and socioeconomic differences between supporters of the two parties, (as well) concern with abortion was strongly related to education” (Abramowitz 1995, 182).

Education and Socioeconomic impacts on Abortion voting

While education, socioeconomic status, and political knowledge are strongly correlated with one another, it's not surprising that a only a third (35%) of voters who did not complete high school knew the candidates' positions, and only 7% of those voters were abortion salient- the lowest cohort for both categories. On the contrary, three fourths (76%) of college graduates knew the candidates' positions and 35% of them were abortion salient- the highest group for both categories. “Similarly, two thirds (67%) of upper income voters knew both candidates' positions compared with less than half (49%) of lower income voters. At least on the issue of abortion, the potential for policy-based voting was much greater among well-educated and affluent voters than among less-educated and economically deprived voters” (Abramowitz 1995, 182). In comparison, Christopher Blunt in his work "Turnaround on Abortion" (Appendix 7c) argues that “education is also associated with abortion attitudes, with pro-choice support tending to increase with years of schooling. That relationship seems to have weekend considerably since 1992. However, fifteen years ago (in 1992), those with any undergraduate education (37%) and those with post-graduate degrees (42%) were overwhelmingly strongly pro-choice; fewer than one in five (18%) would admit to being strongly pro-life” (Blunt 2007, 6).

Another interesting comparison to make between the NES data sets is the difference between abortion attitudes within political parties as a whole (Appendix 1c) and abortion positions

based on knowledge of the candidates' positions and abortion saliency (Appendix 3c). Nearly one third (32%) of all voters who knew the candidates' positions and were abortion salient believed abortion should never be allowed, while in Appendix 1c, only 8% of Democrats, 7% of Independents, and 11% of Republicans felt that abortion should never be allowed. Only 24% of those voters who knew the candidates' positions and were abortion salient believed that abortion is a woman's choice, which is significantly less than the 56% of Democrats, 50% of Independents, and 39% of Republicans in Appendix 1c who believed that abortion should be a woman's choice.

One striking difference between Blunt's and Abramowitz's research is that Abramowitz used very isolated data sets from 1992, which provided a brief snapshot of polling data in 1992, however, Blunt compares and contrasts data sets from 1992 and 2006, which allows for a long-term analysis on the effects of education and abortion. Although Abramowitz specifically decided to focus on the 1992 election, Blunt's long-term comparison provides a greater sense of abortion saliency in 1992 compared to modern data from 2006.

When examining Appendix 7c, one can see that while 42% of post-graduates in 1992 were pro-choice, only 28% in 2006 considered themselves pro-choice, a -14% decrease over a 14 year period. On the other hand, there are drastic changes in pro-life views, as every educational category increased its pro-life support from 1992 to 2006, most notably the post-graduates whom 18% of were pro-life in 1992, compared to 35% who were pro-life in 2006- the largest percentage change of any group. Blunt explains this dramatic change by reasoning that because "attention to the news and current affairs tends to increase with years of education, these more dramatic shifts among post-graduates may reflect their greater exposure to news about the abortion issue. When the news was dominated by clinic blockades, post-graduates were the most strongly pro-choice. As the news

environment has changed, it is not surprising that post-graduate perceptions have changed the most” (Blunt 2007, 6).

Just like all policy issues, the media coverage for abortion ebbs and flows as focusing events such as Supreme Court rulings and violent acts bring the issue to light and re-energize one side, until the issue fades and the public shifts its attention to something else. When post-graduates saw television coverage of abortion clinic bombings, they were more likely to have sympathetic views towards abortion, and as the issue faded over time, so did the perception of abortion among post-graduates.

Analysis: Abortion and its impact on the 1992 President Election

In order to prove his hypothesis that abortion had a greater affect on the election than any other policy issue, Abramowitz preformed two probit analyses, “one for all Clinton and Bush voters and one for those Clinton and Bush voters who were aware of the candidates’ position on abortion and for whom abortion was a salient issue...In addition to abortion, the policy issues included in the probit analyses were affirmative action, social welfare, defense spending, the death penalty, and the Gulf War” (Abramowitz 1995, 184). Abramowitz’s analysis of the 1992 NES data sets in Appendix 4c, indicate that among all voters “the coefficient for Abortion (.129) had the strongest effect of any of the policy issues included in the analysis, including the Gulf War (-.014), defense spending (-.043), affirmative action (.053) and social welfare (.050)” (Abramowitz 1995, 184). In addition, as indicated in previous Appendixes, abortion attitudes had a stronger effect on candidate choice among those who were ‘concerned and aware’ with a coefficient of (.519) which nearly quadrupled the abortion coefficient (.129) for the entire voting population in the sample. Abramowitz’s comprehensive analysis of the 1992 presidential election indicates:

In the case of abortion, members of this issue public were disproportionately white, affluent, and well-educated. As a result, abortion had a much greater impact on the Republican party than on the Democratic party. The Clinton-Gore ticket suffered few defections from pro-life Democrats because most of these Democrats either didn't know the candidates' positions on abortion or didn't care about the issue. In contrast, the Bush-Quayle ticket suffered a substantial number of defections from pro-choice Republicans, although most of these Republican defectors cast their ballots for Perot rather than Clinton...Furthermore, abortion attitudes had a much stronger effect on candidate choice among the subset of voters who were aware of the candidates' positions on abortion and for whom abortion was a salient issue: the estimated coefficient for the abortion variable was almost four times larger for the 'aware and concerned' group than the entire electorate (Abramowitz 1995, 185).

While his research does indicate that abortion was a salient issue for those voters who were aware and concerned about abortion, Abramowitz's final analysis indicates that abortion played a role in the election, but it was not the deciding issue, the economy was the decisive issue! The analysis does however, indicate that a single policy issue such as abortion can lead to party switching among a small cohort of voters, especially those who are well-educated and abortion salient.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Abramowitz's case study

By incorporating NES data sets and probit analyses, along with reputable scholarly articles, Abramowitz makes a convincing argument to support his assertion that abortion did have a significant influence on candidate choice in the overall Presidential election of 1992, although it was not the divisive of an issue as Abramowitz originally thought. Abramowitz's case study also offers a unique insight into policy voting on abortion after key "focusing events" such as *Webster v. Reproductive Services* (1989) and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* (1992), which particularly makes his research fascinating. Although most typically associate the 1992 election as being dominated by the economy, Abramowitz's analysis indicates that abortion was a major issue in the overall electorate, especially for those voters who were "knowledgeable" and considered themselves abortion salient. Although Republican defectors largely voted for Perot rather than Clinton, a vote for Perot was a vote against Republicans, which helped Clinton seize the Presidency. However, Abramowitz later concluded that while abortion was a major issue in the election and contributed in part to party defections for both

political parties, the economy was the primary issue in the election and likely had a greater effect on candidate choice than abortion.

Overall, while Abramowitz's case study provides an interesting analysis of the effects abortion had on a national level during the early 1990s, I believe much of his short-term data is very raw and isolated, therefore only offering a small glimpse into such a colossal policy issue. Another weakness in his research was that his research in 1992 was "the first in the history of national election studies to ask respondents to give their perceptions of the positions of Democratic and Republican presidential candidates on abortion," which may explain why his results indicate that more Republicans defected than Democrats. I think one way Abramowitz could have strengthened his argument would be to incorporate post election issue voting results data with his data collected from the NES, in order to prove that the issue of abortion plagued the Republican party in the 1992 Presidential election, and caused X amount of voters to defect to the third party candidate, Ross Perot.

Probability of Democrat/ Republican Party defections after Webster and Casey

While Alan Abramowitz analyzed the 1992 Presidential election as a case study to determine if abortion attitudes had a significant impact on candidate choice and party defections in a specific Presidential election, Mitchell Killian and Clyde Wilcox in their 2008 article, *Do Abortion Attitudes Lead to Party Switching?*, examined whether "issues such as abortion can lead people to switch parties and whether the effect of abortion attitudes is asymmetrical" (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 561). As abortion activists continued to expand their financial power and political influence from the 1980s to the early 1990s, Killian and Wilcox first analyzed NES panel data sets in two waves 1990-91 and 1991-92 which occurred shortly after the 1989 Supreme Court case of *Webster v. Reproductive Services*,

and overlapped *Casey v. Pennsylvania (1992)*, in order to understand how abortion and the Court cases impacted party defections. The methodology of their research (Appendix 8c) was coded as:

The dependent variables for the model Democrats in initial wave are coded 1 for individuals who identify with the Democratic party in the initial wave and identify with the Republican party in the subsequent wave and 0 for individuals who identify with the Democratic party in both waves.

The dependent variables for the model Republicans in initial wave are coded 1 for individuals who identify with the Republican party in the initial wave and identify with the Democratic party in the subsequent wave and 0 for individuals who identify with the Republican party in both waves (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 565).

The results in Appendix 8c (shown below on page 27) from the short-term NES data sets indicate that abortion attitudes after *Webster* led to significant party switching in both directions during 1991-1992. While the initial panel wave from 1990-91 show that both Democrats (-0.06) and Republicans (-0.82) closely identified with their political party, the second wave of 1991-92 had drastic changes. Abortion attitudes in 1991-92 for Democrats were (-0.43) while Republicans were coded at (0.47), a significant change for both parties, as Democrats who identified with Democrats in the 1990-91 panel more closely identified with Republicans in the second wave of 1991-92 a change of (-0.38); similarly, Republicans who identified with the Republican party in the 1990-91 panel more closely identified with Democrats in the second wave of 1991-92 a change of (-0.01).

Appendix 8c

**Estimates of the Effect of Abortion Attitudes on Switching Political Parties
in National Election Studies Panel Data Sets: 1990–91, 1991–92, 1990–92**

	Democrats in Initial Panel Wave			Republicans in Initial Panel Wave		
	1990–91	1991–92	1990–92	1990–91	1991–92	1990–92
Independent variables						
Abortion attitude ₁₉₉₀	-0.06 (0.23)	-0.43** (0.25)	-0.38** (0.19)	-0.82 (0.49)	0.47** (0.26)	-0.01 (0.25)
Ideology _{t-1}	0.42** (0.24)	0.57*** (0.23)	0.48** (0.21)	-1.02** (0.41)	0.03 (0.25)	0.01 (0.27)
Strength partisanship _{t-1}	-3.48*** (0.96)	-1.37** (0.64)	-2.18*** (0.78)	-5.51** (3.22)	-2.81*** (1.10)	-3.01*** (1.01)
Retrospective sociotropic _{t-1}	-0.41 (0.31)	-0.48 (0.29)	-0.29 (0.29)	-1.21 (0.66)	0.82** (0.37)	0.20 (0.32)
Region _{t-1}	0.60 (0.70)	-0.35 (0.79)	0.68 (0.53)	-0.18 (1.33)	1.07* (0.71)	0.86 (0.71)
Gender	0.98** (0.49)	1.29** (0.56)	0.74* (0.47)	0.30 (0.78)	-1.05** (0.63)	-0.86** (0.52)
Age _{t-1}	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.22** (0.11)	-0.17** (0.09)
Age _{t-1} × age _{t-1}	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Education _{t-1}	-0.10 (0.59)	-0.90 (0.67)	-0.59 (0.56)	-0.24 (1.19)	0.92* (0.58)	0.76* (0.51)
Race	-0.61 (1.06)	—	-1.99** (1.08)	—	—	—
Constant	3.64 (2.96)	0.81 (2.11)	1.14 (2.35)	11.07 (5.70)	1.39 (2.35)	3.84* (2.45)
Number of observations	367	282	370	294	255	278
Log likelihood	-447.74	-365.71	-463.55	-311.19	-320.05	-340.42

Killian and Wilcox “suspect that many Republicans in the 1990s began to adopt a moderate ideological identifications in part as a signal of their positions on social issues such as abortion...This data indicates that the mid-1990s was a time when abortion attitudes influenced partisanship” (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 566). Therefore, this comprehensive analysis provides a better understanding of party defection in 1992 compared to Abramowitz’s case study. Because both parties suffered defections, it’s very difficult to gauge the specific number of defections contributed solely to abortion, as Abramowitz attempted to do. More importantly, Abramowitz also failed to take in account the fiscal conservatives within the GOP who were disenchanted with Bush after he broke a campaign promise made in 1988 and raised taxes in order to reduce the federal deficit. This coupled with a weak economy, significantly impacted Bush’s support from those most loyal GOP supporters within his own base.

Probability of Democrats becoming Republicans (mid-1980s to early-1990s)

Unlike Abramowitz's analysis that abortion attitudes in the 1992 Presidential election forced Republican voters to defect to Perot the third party candidate, Killian and Wilcox argue that it was actually pro-life Democrats who were more likely to defect to the Republican party. Appendix 10c, examines the probability that the average Democrat switched to the Republican party from 1982 to 1997. The data indicates that "the probability of the average Democrat defecting to the Republican party was 5.7 percent...the probability that a pro-life Democrat switched parties, who had all of the other characteristics of the average Democrat, was 12.2 percent. In other words, all else equal, a pro-life Democrat was 2.1 times more likely to switch parties" (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 569). These results which look at the probability of the average Democrat switching parties to become a Republican between 1982 and 1997, seem to directly conflict with Abramowitz's case study analysis of the 1992 Presidential election, which he concludes that Republicans, not Democrats were more likely to switch parties over the issue of abortion.

Probability of Republicans becoming Democrats (mid-1980s to early-1990s)

Appendix 11c, examines the probability that the average Republican switched to the Democratic party from 1982 to 1997, just as Appendix 10c did with Democrats switching to the Republican party. The results indicate that the "probability of this average Republican defecting to the Democratic party was 3.3 percent- that is, over the course of the panel, average Democrats were more likely to defect to the Republican Party. Holding all else constant, a pro-choice Republican was 10.2 percent more likely to become a Democrat party identifier. That is, a pro-choice Republican was 3.1 times more likely to switch parties" (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 569).

Analysis: Do Abortion Attitudes Lead to Party Switching?

Killian and Wilcox in their analysis concluded that they found evidence that abortion attitudes move partisanship in both direction as indicated in Appendix 10c and 11c, where both pro-life Democrats and pro-choice Republicans each respectively were more than 2.1 and 3.1 times more likely to switch parties.

This result is important, for it suggests that over longer periods of time, party switching has been a sorting of partisans from both sides of the abortion issue...Our results do not imply that partisanship is unstable and easily moved by short-term forces. In fact, our results show that even the most pro-life Democrats or pro-choice Republicans are much more likely to remain with their current political party than they are to defect to the opposing party (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 571).

Their results demonstrate that partisanship and party affiliation moves when parties send clear signals on issue. This assertion is logical as the Republican party platform was overtly pro-life, while the Democratic platform was visibly pro-choice in the 1992 election (Appendix 1b and 2b). Perhaps more importantly, partisanship may move when *candidates* send clear signals on issues. Leading up to the 1992 election, President Bush had anxieties of maintaining support within his conservative base, especially among social conservatives.

After being attacked by many conservatives for abandoning his read-my-lips-no-new-taxes pledge, (Bush) seemed determined to stand firm on some issue dear to conservatives. Apparently, abortion was to be *the issue*, and Bush seemed prepared to use all his weapons- his veto, the appointment and direction of members of his administration, and his appointive power in connection with the federal bench- to accomplish his purpose (Craig 1993, 314).

Although some argue that Bush personally wasn't as pro-life as the GOP platform portrayed, because he had already alienated many fiscal GOP conservatives by raising taxes in order to reduce the deficit, he could not afford to also alienate the social conservatives within the GOP, so President Bush campaigned on his party's hard-line pro-life stance as articulated in the GOPs platform on abortion. Similarly, Clinton actively campaigned as a pro-choice candidate who would appoint pro-

choice Justices to the Supreme Court bench, which drew considerable support from pro-choice supporters on both sides of the political aisle.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Killian and Wilcox's Study

Killian and Wilcox effectively utilized both short-term and long-term NES data sets to explore whether abortion attitudes caused party defections, as well, the use of The Youth-Parent Socialization Panel, helped provide a historical context by examining long-term abortion changes. However, they were only able to use the *Youth* portion of the Youth-Parent panel because only the youth were re-interviewed in 1977. Another strong point to Killian and Wilcox's analysis was the inclusion of key variables which affected party defections.

Across an extended period of time, 1982 to 1997, in which social identities within the political parties transformed and the polarization of party elites accelerated, living in the South and gender influenced the decision of where to switch political parties. Specifically, being from the South had an asymmetric effect on party switching- it affected only whether Democrats became Republicans...These findings are critical for future analyses of changes in party identification. They highlight a limitation of testing theory primarily based on short-term panels; therefore, these results should serve to raise awareness of the value of collecting long-term panel data (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 568).

While Killian and Wilcox effectively used and manipulated NES and long-term data, there were a few notable flaws and weaknesses in their research, which in some cases it was out of their control and they were forced to work with what they had. For example, the "NES panels do not cover all years and, most important, do not cover the period from 1988 through 1990, when the *Webster* decision led to a sharp increase in pro-choice sentiments in most surveys...Thus, it is possible that by chance the years in which the NES conducted panels are years with greater switching to the GOP than from the party" (Killian and Wilcox 2008, 571). Another flaw that was uncontrollable was the fact that the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel data that Killian and Wilcox used for their long-term analysis prior to 1982 did not ask about abortion attitudes, therefore, limiting the scope of the research. For future research, Killian and Wilcox suggest the importance to

thoroughly explore the role of ideology in partisan change as well as the necessity to account for control variables such as being from the South.

Research Design

The first aspect of my research design section is to establish and narrow my topic of study, and to determine why it is important or relevant to my research. The topic I have selected to study in depth is abortion self-placement based on 3 generational cohorts, compared with other dependent and control variables in order to determine if there is a causal and reciprocal relationship between abortion views and the selected variables and controls. While much of my literature review section analyzed research and data from the 1980s and 1990s, with a focus on the 1992 presidential election, my individual research design will examine SPSS data sets from 2004 and 2006 in order to explore and analyze current abortion polling and data.

My first hypothesis in my research design is that *Democrats born after 1950 will be more likely to have pro-choice views on abortion, while Republicans born after 1950 will be more likely to have pro-life views on abortion.* Because democrats are likely to be pro-choice and Republicans are likely to be pro-life, this hypothesis looks to prove this assumption for persons born after 1950 who would be college or high school students at the time of the decision in Roe in 1973. Therefore using 2004 SPSS data sets in Crosstab #1, my dependent variable is abortion position self-placement on a four point scale, my independent variable is 3 Generations (persons born in 3 different generations), while my control variable is party identification. Looking at Crosstab #1 in my Research Design section, one can see that 52.3% of Democrats born from 1950-65 and 50.9% of Democrats born after 1965 believe that by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, while only 16.5% of Republicans born from 1950-65 and 21.1% of Republicans born after 1965 believe that by law abortion should never be legal.

These findings concur with my hypothesis to some extent, as clearly demonstrated in the majority of Democrats who hold less-restrictive, pro-choice views on abortion, however there is a clear difference in Republicans who less than one quarter believe in the most-restrictive, pro-life stance that abortion by law should never be legal. What stands out is the percentage of Republicans whose views on abortion directly contradict their party's platform on abortion. Surprisingly, more Republican respondents have less-restrictive pro-choice views on abortion, than Republican respondents who have traditional, more-restrictive pro-life views on abortion as typically held by GOP supporters. Over 30.9% of Republicans born from 1950-65 and 26.3% of Republicans born after 1960 believe that by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, compared to 15.1% of Democrats born from 1950-65 and just 9.3% of Democrats born after 1965 that believe by law, abortion should never be permitted. The findings are interesting, and indicate that as a whole, respondents are more likely to have less-restrictive, pro-choice views on abortion, even if their political party's platform differs.

When comparing and contrasting the results from Crosstab #1 which includes 2006 SPSS data to Appendix 1c from the 1992 Presidential election, there are a few notable changes which can be seen historically. For example, in Crosstab #1 with SPSS data from 2006, 50.9% of Democrats born after 1965 believe that by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, while Appendix 1c with 1992 NES election data shows 56% of Democrats and 39% of Republicans believe that abortion should be a woman's choice. While there is little change over time among Democrats who view abortion as a woman's choice, one interesting aspect to note, is the large percentage, 39% of Republicans in 1992 who thought abortion should be a woman's choice. This is contrasted with 2006 SPSS data which shows 21.1% of Republicans born after 1950 (Crosstab #1) felt by law, abortion should never be legal, while only 8% of Democrats and 11% of Republicans in the 1992 NES election data set, who believe abortion should never be allowed. These results suggest

that although both Democrats and Republicans in 1992 were less likely to think that abortion should never be legal, in 2006, Republicans by a 10% margin were more likely to believe that by law, abortion should never be legal.

My second hypothesis is that *persons born in the South after 1950 will be more likely to have restrictive, pro-life views on abortion, while people not born in the South after 1950 will be more likely to have less restrictive, pro-choice views on abortion.* Because today, typically those who live in the South are more likely to associate with the Republican party and have more pro-life views on abortion, I want to see if there is a generational effect on abortion attitudes for those who live in the South and those who do not live in the South. By using 2004 SPSS data sets in Crosstab #2, I made my dependent variable Abortion position (on a four point scale), 3 generations as my independent variable, while living in the South/Non-South was my control variable. When examining Crosstab #2, one can see that 45.9% of persons born during 1950-65 and 44.5% of those who were born after 1965 who do not live in the South believe that by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, compared to 23.8% (born 1950-65) and just 14.5% (born after 1965) who live in the South believe that by law, abortion should never be permitted. Interestingly, 32.1% (born 1950-65) and 36.3% (1965) who live in the South believe that by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, compared to just 9.6% (born 1950-65) and 9.2% (born after 1965) who believe that by law, abortion should never be legal. These results show nearly a 10% difference between those who live in the South and those who do not live in the South who believe that abortion should always be legal.

Therefore based on these results, while the data does not overwhelming demonstrate abortion differences between those who live in the South and those who do not live in the South, the data does indicate some relationship, as those who do not live in the South are more likely to

have less restrictive, pro-choice views on access to abortion compared to those who live in the South and have more restrictive, pro-life views on abortion.

My third hypothesis is that *persons born after 1950 who have higher educational achievement (some college or more) will be more likely to have less restrictive, pro-choice views on abortion, while those born after 1950 with no college experience, will be more likely to have restrictive, pro-life views on abortion.* Because I know that education achievement has an effect on abortion views and overall campaign knowledge, as indicated in my literature review section, I want to examine whether educational achievement causes persons to have more liberal, pro-choice views on abortion compared to persons with no college experience who like likely have more conservative, pro-life views on abortion. Therefore, by using 2004 SPSS data sets in Crosstab #3, my dependent variable was abortion position (on a four point scale), 3 Generations was my independent variable, while educational level on a three point scale was my control variable.

Based on my results in Crosstab #3, one can clearly see the impact education has on abortion views. 57.3% (born 1950-65) and 55.7% (born after 1965) who have at least a college degree believe that by law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion; while 35.3% (born 1950-65) and 38.6% (born after 1965) who have completed some college, and 32.7% (born 1950-65), 33.6% (born after 1965) who have no college experience believe that by law a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion. The results indicate a 20% change between those with at least some college experience compared to those with no college education, on their abortion views, which helps prove my hypothesis that those with greater educational experience are more likely to have pro-choice views on abortion, while those with no college are more likely to have pro-life views on abortion. Interestingly, for persons born after 1965, 10.3% (who have college degree or above), 12.1 (some college) and 10.3% (no college) believe that by law abortion should never be allowed.

However an astounding 70.8% of persons born before 1950 with no college education believe that by law abortion should never be legal.

This data suggests significant generational disparities on abortion views and attitudes between those born before 1950 and those born 1950-65 and after 1965. 26.4% of those respondents born before 1950 with no college education think abortion should always be legal, while over 32% of persons born after 1950 with some college experience or more think abortion should be legal. The greatest generational difference can be seen in the college grad cohort as just 37% born before 1950 believe abortion by law should always be legal compared to over 55% of college grads born after 1950 who believe abortion should always be legal.

When compared to 1992 NES election data sets from Appendix 3c, it's evident that educational achievement not only increase the likelihood that a that a voter will know the candidates' positions on abortion, but also, voters with advanced educational achievement are likely to be abortion salient. Only 35% of respondents in the 1992 NES survey who did not complete high school knew the candidates' positions, while 60% (some college experience) and 76% of college graduates knew the candidates' positions on abortion. More importantly in order to show the reciprocal relationship between educational achievement and abortion saliency, Appendix 3c, shows that only 7% who didn't complete high school knew the candidates' positions on abortion and considered themselves to be abortion salient. Over one quarter of respondents, 26% with some college experience, and 35% of college graduates knew the candidates' positions on abortion, and considered themselves to be abortion salient. Therefore these results suggest that there is a reciprocal relationship between educational achievement and abortion saliency among voters. Those with some college or college grads were significantly more likely to be abortion salient, as those with

less educational achievement were not only significantly less likely to know the candidates' positions on abortion, but were also significantly less likely to be abortion salient.

Furthermore, my correlation in crosstab #9 shows the correlation between importance of abortion, abortion position self-placement, and education (3 categories). When examining the data set, the strongest Pearson's-R correlation can be seen between abortion self-placement and Education (3 categories) with a correlation of .183, which is very strong. This indicates that there is a reciprocal relationship between education achievement and abortion placement of whether abortion should be legal or not. The results suggest that there is a strong relationship between abortion views and education, as previously articulated with the results from crosstab #3. Furthermore, the Pearson's-R correlation between abortion self-placement and abortion importance has a correlation of .135, which also shows a strong correlation between the two variables. Therefore, the greater a person's importance on abortion, the greater their abortion self-placement will be.

My fourth hypothesis is that *Republicans before after 1950 will likely view abortion as a very important issue to them, compared to Independents and Democrats born after 1950 who will not view abortion as a very important issue to them*. Because both generations 1950-65 and after-1965 were alive during or shortly after the Roe decision, I believe Republicans who typically have pro-life views and thus reject the high Court's ruling in Roe, will view abortion as a very important issue, compared to Democrats who are typically pro-choice and thus support the court's decision in Roe. Groups who feel threatened are more likely to be active and engaged in an issue such as abortion in order to effectuate change, compared to those groups who are complacent, as pro-choice supporters were after the decision in Roe.

By utilizing 2004 SPSS data sets in Crosstab #4, I used importance of abortion (on a four point scale) as my dependent variable, 3 generations as my independent variable, and I used party identification as my control variable. The results from crosstab #4, indicate that 41.7% (born after 1965) and 37.5% (born 1950-65) of Democrats say abortion is an “extremely important” issue to them compared with 28.3% (born after 1965) and 28.1% (born 1950-65) of Independents and 30.2% (born after 1965) and 31.6% (born 1950-65) of Republicans say abortion is an “extremely important” issue to them. Surprisingly, just 1.1% (born 1950-65) and 0.9% (born after 1965) of Democrats and 7.1% (born 1950-65) and 9.4% (born after 1965) of Republicans say that abortion is “not too important” to them.

Therefore, these results indicate that abortion is an important issue to Democrats, Independents, and Republicans, however, the results disprove my hypothesis, as Democrats are significantly more likely to view abortion as an “extremely important” issue than are Independents and Republicans. This assertion can be further proved by the fact that a total of 70.5% of Democrats born after 1965 say abortion is at least a very important issue to them, compared to 57.3% of Independents and 68.7% of Republicans born after 1965 that say abortion is at least a very important issue to them. Furthermore, Democrats in the 3 generation categories also had the most generational change among any cohort over the importance of abortion. Just 25.8% of Democrats born before 1950 viewed abortion as an extremely important issue compared to 37.5% (born 1950-65) and 41.7% (born after 1965) of Democrats who viewed abortion as an extremely important issue to them. These results are not very surprising, considering the fact that abortion did not become a very significant issue until after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Roe v. Wade* in 1973.

My fifth hypothesis is that *Democrats who are very interested in political campaigns will be more likely to have less-restrictive, pro-choice views on abortion, compared to Democrats who are not very interested in campaigns; and, Republicans who are very interested in political campaign will be more likely to have more restrictive, pro-life views on abortion, compared to Republicans who are not very interested in political campaigns.* While in my literature review section, I established how the issue of abortion is more salient for those who are more politically active, in this hypothesis I want to explore the relationships between those who consider themselves to be very politically active compared to those who are not very interested in political campaigns for both Democrats and Republicans. By using 2004 SPSS data sets, I used abortion position (on a four point scale) as my dependent variable, while I used interest in campaigns as my independent variable, with party identification as my control variable.

Based on the data collected in Crosstab #6, there's a reciprocal relationship between interest in political campaigns and abortion self-placement. The results from Democrats indicate the biggest change, as only 33.3% of Democrats who are not very interested in campaigns believe that by law, abortion should always be legal compared to 40.6% (those somewhat interested in campaigns) and 54.3% (those very interested in campaigns) who feel that by law, abortion should always be legal. The data indicates that for Democrats, the more politically active someone is, the more likely they will believe that abortion by law should always be legal. On the other hand, of Republicans 26.3% (born before 1950), 26.2% (born 1950-65), and 21.9% (born after 1965) believe that by law, abortion should never be legal. Interestingly, 26.3% of Republicans who consider themselves to be very interested in campaigns believe that by law, a woman should always be able to have an abortion, while 10.7% of Democrats who consider themselves to be very interested in campaigns feel that by law abortion should never be legal- both of these cohort's completely contradict their political party's abortion platform.

When comparing these findings with NES election data from 1992 (below in Appendix 5c), there is a strong relationship between knowledge and concern on issue-based voting. Among those who were voting for Clinton, an astonishing 86% of voters who were aware of the candidates' abortion position but not abortion salient felt that abortion was a woman's choice, compared with voters who were unaware of the candidates' position on abortion, which show 72% believe abortion should never be allowed- directly contradicting the party's 1992 abortion platform. Perhaps the most interesting statistic is the Kendall's Tau measurement of .63 for those Clinton voters who were aware and abortion salient, which suggests a strong reciprocal relationship: the more knowledgeable and aware a voter, the more likely they will be abortion salient and believe abortion should be a woman's choice. Conversely, the Tau measurement of -.12 for Clinton voters who were unaware of candidates' position, indicate a negative relationship, which further proves that for Clinton voters, knowledge and concern over issue-based policy voting on abortion had a direct relationship to the respondents feelings on abortion, which was overwhelming in support of a woman's choice.

THE INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONCERN ON ISSUE-BASED VOTING

Abortion Position	Percentage for Clinton among Voters		
	Unaware of Candidates Positions	Aware but Abortion not Salient	Aware and Abortion Salient
Never allowed	72	42	8
Rarely allowed	63	46	12
If clear need	39	54	60
Woman's choice	54	86	75
Tau	-.12*	.40**	.63**
n	520	465	323

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Note: Based on Bush and Clinton voters only.

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

Overall, the results collected in Crosstab #6 and Appendix 5c, indicate that my initial hypothesis was correct, especially for Democrats, as there were a direct correlation between democrats as the more a Democrat considered themselves to be very interested in political

campaign, they more likely they would have pro-choice, less restrictive abortion views. The same is true for Republicans, although the data suggests a greater connection between campaign interest and abortion views for Democrats. One interesting conclusion is that while a significant amount of Republicans (26.3%) who consider themselves very interested in political campaigns held a more pro-choice stance on abortion and view that by law a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, these people still consider themselves as Republicans, even though their views on abortion differ from their party's platform. This result indicates that while people may have very strong views on abortion which may conflict with their political party's platform on abortion, they still associate themselves as members of that party.

When comparing data in crosstab #6 from 2006 SPSS data to 1992 NES data in Appendix 3c, it's evident that educational achievement not only increases the likelihood that a voter will be interested in campaigns and know the candidates' position on abortion, but also voters with advanced educational achievement are more likely to be abortion salient. Only 35% who did not complete high school in the 1992 NES data set knew the candidates' positions on abortion, while 60% (with some college experience) and 76% of College graduates knew the candidates' positions. More importantly, only 7% who did not complete high school knew the candidates' positions on abortion, while 26% (some college) and 35% of College graduates knew the candidates' positions on abortion and were abortion salient. Therefore, the results from 1992 NES data in Appendix 3c, and 2006 SPSS data in Crosstab #1, indicate that educational achievement not only increases the likelihood of having pro-choice views on abortion, but it also increases the likelihood of knowing the Presidential candidates' position on abortion and being salient on the issue of abortion. Overall, the greater the education, the greater chance a person will be abortion salient with pro-choice views.

Problems with My Research

Because Roanoke College does not have access to some of the larger data sets such as NES and other collective data sets, my research section was limited to the data sets available in 2004 and 2006 SPSS data sets. Therefore, while I would have liked to perform my own research and analysis of abortion attitudes during the 1992 presidential election, by using current SPSS data sets, I am able to provide a historical analysis of abortion by showing where abortion as an issue was in 1992 and where abortion is now based on current polling. If I had more time and resources such as manpower and funding, I would like to do phone surveys using RDD (random digit dialing) with a series of questions focusing on abortion in relation to Supreme Court decisions such as *Roe v. Wade*, as well as abortion policy and funding. I think this poll would provide a more in-depth data set which I could use to compare and contrast the results with results from polls after key Supreme Court decisions such as *Roe*, *Webster*, and *Casey* in order to see if abortion views have changed over time.

Additionally, if I had access to NES short-term and medium-term panel studies from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, I would use the data in order to establish a “baseline.” After establishing a baseline for comparison, I would compare and contrast short-term and long-term NES election data sets to compare the impacts of abortion attitudes on partisanship over time, with a focus on the early 1990s. More importantly, I would focus on key variables such as: partisanship, party identification, educational achievement, and geographic location. These four variables are critical in order to understand the historical evolution of abortion, and what factors impact a person’s views on abortion. In order to tie all of the research together, I would analyze the results from my random digit dialing along with the short-term and medium-term NES data sets from the 1980s to early 1990s in order to see if there is any correlation between my survey and the data sets.

Overall Analysis of My Research

Overall, my research indicates that while abortion is still a prominent issue for some voters, which may at times conflict with their associated political parties abortion platform, the voters still consider themselves as members of that party, regardless of the fact that their views on abortion differs from their party. By utilizing the “3 Generation” data set as an Independent variable compared with dependent variables of abortion position and importance of abortion, I was able to find significant generational differences between those born before 1950, those born during 1950-65, and those born after 1965, most notably seen in Crosstab #3. In Crosstab #3, there are significant generational differences between the three generations with relationship to educational experience. A total of 26.4% (born before 1950) with no college experience think abortion should be legal, while over 32% of persons born after 1950 with some college or college graduates think abortion should be legal. The greatest generational difference can be seen in the college grad cohort as just 37% born before 1950 believe that abortion by law should always be legal, compared to over 55% of college graduates after 1950 who think abortion by law should always be legal.

While I have identified the role education levels have on abortion views, the most intriguing results come from Crosstab #4 which shows how important abortion is to the individual respondent. 41.7% (born after 1965) and 37.5% (born 1950-65) of Democrats say abortion is an “extremely important” issue to them compared with 30.2% (born after 1965) and 31.6% (born 1950-65) of Republicans who say abortion is an “extremely important” issue to them. While over 30% of those Democratic and Republican respondents born after 1950 cite abortion as an “extremely important” issue, just 0.9% of Democrats born after 1965 and 9.4% of Republicans born after 1965 say abortion is “not too important” to them.

Therefore, because abortion is such an easily understood issue, the overwhelming majority of Democrat and Republican respondents at least thought abortion was an important issue and had an opinion on the subject, even if it went against their political party's platform. As suggested by Killian and Wilcox, party affiliation moves when parties send clear signals on the issue, and more importantly, partisanship moves when candidates send clear signals on the issue.

The results shown in my research section demonstrate that abortion is an issue in which almost everyone has an opinion on one way or another, but that while people's views on abortion might go against their party's platform on abortion, they still consider themselves to be a member of that party. Abortion is a divisive issue, but today the issue is only salient for a small percentage of society, and the overwhelming majority of voters don't vote based on abortion. While the issue of abortion caused some abortion salient voters to switch parties in 1992, my research indicates that the economy was the primary issue, especially within the GOP as fiscal conservatives were angered by former President Bush's reversal from a 1988 campaign promise to not raise taxes.

Overall, there are three central themes which develop in order to understand the historical impacts of abortion on American politics and elections: judicial importance of precedent, the role of the Supreme Court and the White House, and the ebbs and flows of Abortion attention and media coverage. Because the common law legal system in the United States is dependent upon established precedent, it is unlikely that Roe would ever be fully overturned as articulated in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Webster. Precedent for the constitutional protections of abortion was established in the court's ruling in Roe, and since then, while Supreme Court decisions in Webster and Casey have attempted to incrementally disassemble the ruling in Roe, the court has never, and will likely never fully overturn Roe.

Another important theme with abortion policy is the role of the Supreme Court and the White House. While policy making is a job primarily vested upon the Congressional branch of

government, with the issue of abortion, it has been the Supreme Court that has shaped and altered abortion policy since 1973. While Congress has tried to restrict federal funding for abortions most notably seen in the Hyde Amendment which prevents any federal funds from going to abortion practices, the Supreme Court has acted as the primary authority over abortion policy, as the Court's decisions in cases such as Roe, Webster, and Casey dictate how much power and autonomy states have over abortion and access. Another important theme is the role of the President and the White House, as Presidential power with judicial appointments help secure the long-term interests of the party in power. As seen with Clinton's Administration, the President was able to not only appoint hundreds of lower court justices, but he was also able to appoint two pro-choice justices to the Supreme Court bench, which had far reaching, and long-term legal ramifications for abortion protections and access.

The final theme with abortion policy in the United States is the ebbs and flows of abortion attention and media coverage. While abortion was a very visible and prominent issue before and during the 1992 presidential election, abortion played a minimal role in the most recent 2008 presidential election. But just when people think the issue has faded, it comes up with little forewarning. This can be seen in the recent budget debate before the potential government shutdown, when strong social conservative members within the GOP tried to attach "abortion policy riders" onto the budget extension, which if passed, would have prevented any government funds from going to Planned Parenthood. Although the Hyde-Amendment already prevents federal funding from going to abortion, social conservatives within the GOP used the rider to bring the debate over abortion back into the political discussion. While the abortion policy rider eventually failed to be passed along with the budget extension, it's obvious the issue is still relevant and important to both political parties, especially as we prepare for the upcoming 2012 Presidential election.

APPENDIX


Appendix Section A- BACKGROUND STATS/ INFO

Appendix 1a: Public Opinion on Legal Abortion (Pew Research Center, 1).

Less Support for Legal Abortion					
	Aug 2008		April 2009		Change in legal
	Legal %	Ill- legal %	Legal %	Ill- legal %	
Total	54	41	46	44	-8
Men	53	42	43	46	-10
Women	54	42	49	42	-5
18-29	52	45	47	48	-5
30-49	55	40	50	41	-5
50-64	58	37	47	41	-11
65+	46	48	36	48	-10
<i>Among men</i>					
18-49	53	42	45	47	-8
50+	53	41	40	45	-13
<i>Among women</i>					
18-49	55	41	53	41	-2
50+	53	42	45	43	-8

Legal combines "legal in all cases" and "legal in most cases."
 Illegal combines "legal in all cases" and "legal in most cases."

Appendix 2a: Voter Turnout in the 1992 Presidential Election (Leip, 1).



Appendix Section B- Party Abortion Platforms on Abortion (1992)

Appendix 1b: The 1992 Republican Party Platform on Abortion (Rubin 1994, 243).

“We believe the unborn child has a fundamental independent right to life that cannot be infringed. We therefore reaffirm our support for a human life amendment to the Constitution, and we endorse legislation to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to unborn children. We oppose using public revenues for abortion and will not fund organizations that advocate it. We commend those who provide alternative to abortion by meeting the needs of mothers and offering adoption services. We reaffirm our support for appointment of judges who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of human life.”

Appendix 2b: The 1992 Democratic Party Platform on Abortion (Rubin 1994, 243).

“Choice. Democrats stand behind the right of every woman to choose, consistent with Roe v. Wade, regardless of ability to pay, and support a national law to protect that right. It is a fundamental constitutional liberty that individual Americans- not government- can best take responsibility for making the most difficult and intensely personal decisions regarding reproduction. The goal of our nation must be to make abortion less necessary, not more difficult or more dangerous. We pledge to support contraceptive research, family planning, comprehensive family life education, and policies that support healthy child-bearing and enable parents to care most effective for their children”

Appendix Section C- Abortion and the 1992 Presidential Election

Appendix 1c: 1992 NES data on Abortion Position of Voters based on Party Identification (Abramowitz, 179)

ABORTION POSITION OF VOTERS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Abortion Position	Party Identification		
	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Never allowed	8%	7%	11%
Rarely allowed	23%	27%	36%
If clear need	13%	17%	15%
Woman’s choice	56%	50%	39%
Total	100%	101%	101%
n	601	418	453

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Note: Based on respondents who reported voting in presidential election. Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.

Appendix 2c: 1992 NES data on Presidential Vote by Abortion Position and Party ID (Abramowitz, 180)

1992 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY ABORTION POSITION
AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	Percentage Voting for		
	Bush	Clinton	Perot
<i>All Voters</i>			
Never allowed (<i>n</i> = 139)	48	40	12
Rarely allowed (<i>n</i> = 436)	46	38	16
If clear need (<i>n</i> = 237)	42	39	19
Woman's choice (<i>n</i> = 803)	22	58	20
<i>Democrats</i>			
Never allowed (<i>n</i> = 49)	6	88	6
Rarely allowed (<i>n</i> = 135)	13	78	9
If clear need (<i>n</i> = 80)	12	79	9
Woman's choice (<i>n</i> = 337)	5	84	11
<i>Independents</i>			
Never allowed (<i>n</i> = 40)	50	22	28
Rarely allowed (<i>n</i> = 138)	45	33	22
If clear need (<i>n</i> = 90)	41	29	30
Woman's choice (<i>n</i> = 289)	16	54	29
<i>Republicans</i>			
Never allowed (<i>n</i> = 49)	88	6	6
Rarely allowed (<i>n</i> = 162)	75	8	17
If clear need (<i>n</i> = 67)	79	6	15
Woman's choice (<i>n</i> = 175)	65	12	23

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Appendix 3c: Voter Knowledge of Candidates' Abortion Positions and Salience of Abortion (Abramowitz, 181)

KNOWLEDGE OF CANDIDATES' ABORTION POSITIONS AND SALIENCE OF ABORTION BY SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

	Know Candidates' Positions (%)	Know Positions and Abortion Salient (%)
<i>All voters</i>	59	24
<i>Age</i>		
17-29	56	28
30-39	64	30
40-49	59	24
50-64	62	20
65+	50	14
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	61	22
Female	56	25
<i>Race</i>		
White	60	26
Black	49	8
<i>Education</i>		
0-11th Grade	35	7
Graduated high school	51	18
Some college	60	26
Graduated college	76	35
<i>Income</i>		
Lower	49	14
Middle	61	28
Upper	67	28
<i>Party identification</i>		
Democrat	59	18
Independent	56	23
Republican	62	31
<i>Abortion position</i>		
Never allowed	52	32
Rarely allowed	58	26
If clear need	54	14
Woman's choice	62	24

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Note: Percentages based on respondents who reported voting in presidential election.

Appendix 4c: The Influence of Abortion Compared to Other Major Policy Issues (Abramowitz, 184)

THE INFLUENCE OF ABORTION ATTITUDES ON THE VOTE:
RESULTS OF PROBIT ANALYSES

Independent Variable	All Voters			Aware and Concerned		
	Coeff.	Ratio	Change in Probability	Coeff.	Ratio	Change in Probability
Party Id	.469	13.00***	.34	.551	5.35***	.38
Ideology	.295	4.92***	.15	.295	1.83*	.15
Welfare	.050	2.33**	.07	.027	0.46	.04
Affirm act	.053	1.73*	.06	.070	0.94	.08
Death penalty	-.004	-0.09	-.00	.009	0.08	.00
Defense \$	-.043	0.84	-.02	.025	0.18	.01
Gulf war	-.014	-0.15	-.00	-.391	-1.34	-.12
Fam finances	-.064	-1.06	-.03	-.101	-0.67	-.04
Nat economy	-.188	-4.51***	-.11	-.172	-1.55	-.11
Abortion	.129	2.92***	.08	.519	3.97***	.28
Age	-.002	-0.57	-.01	-.010	-0.89	-.07
Sex (female)	-.368	-2.83***	-.07	.139	0.45	.03
Race (black)	.703	2.41**	.09	-1.044	-1.26	-.13
Education	-.070	-0.96	-.03	-.295	-1.53	-.12
Fam income	-.007	-0.58	-.02	.026	0.83	.06
Constant	.387			.633		

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Note: Dependent variable is presidential vote, coded as "1" for Clinton and "0" for Bush. Change in probability is estimated effect of increase of one standard deviation on each independent variable on probability of voting for Clinton for voter with initial probability of .50.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Appendix 5c: The Influence of Knowledge and Concern on Issue-Based Voting for Clinton (Abramowitz, 183)

THE INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONCERN ON ISSUE-BASED VOTING

Abortion Position	Percentage for Clinton among Voters		
	Unaware of Candidates Positions	Aware but Abortion not Salient	Aware and Abortion Salient
Never allowed	72	42	8
Rarely allowed	63	46	12
If clear need	39	54	60
Woman's choice	54	86	75
Tau	-.12*	.40**	.63**
n	520	465	323

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Note: Based on Bush and Clinton voters only.

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

Appendix 6c: The Influence of Abortion Compared to Other Major Policy Issues (Abramowitz, 184)

THE INFLUENCE OF ABORTION ATTITUDES ON THE VOTE:
RESULTS OF PROBIT ANALYSES


Independent Variable	All Voters			Aware and Concerned		
	Coeff.	Ratio	Change in Probability	Coeff.	Ratio	Change in Probability
Party Id	.469	13.00***	.34	.551	5.35***	.38
Ideology	.295	4.92***	.15	.295	1.83*	.15
Welfare	.050	2.33**	.07	.027	0.46	.04
Affirm act	.053	1.73*	.06	.070	0.94	.08
Death penalty	-.004	-0.09	-.00	.009	0.08	.00
Defense \$	-.043	0.84	-.02	.025	0.18	.01
Gulf war	-.014	-0.15	-.00	-.391	-1.34	-.12
Fam finances	-.064	-1.06	-.03	-.101	-0.67	-.04
Nat economy	-.188	-4.51***	-.11	-.172	-1.55	-.11
Abortion	.129	2.92***	.08	.519	3.97***	.28
Age	-.002	-0.57	-.01	-.010	-0.89	-.07
Sex (female)	-.368	-2.83***	-.07	.139	0.45	.03
Race (black)	.703	2.41**	.09	-1.044	-1.26	-.13
Education	-.070	-0.96	-.03	-.295	-1.53	-.12
Fam income	-.007	-0.58	-.02	.026	0.83	.06
Constant	.387			.633		

Source: 1992 American National Election Study.

Note: Dependent variable is presidential vote, coded as "1" for Clinton and "0" for Bush. Change in probability is estimated effect of increase of one standard deviation on each independent variable on probability of voting for Clinton for voter with initial probability of .50.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Appendix 7c: Change in Abortion Identification by Religion (Blunt, 5)



Appendix 8c: Effect of Abortion Attitudes on Switching Parties (1990-1992) (Killian and Wilcox, 565).

Estimates of the Effect of Abortion Attitudes on Switching Political Parties in National Election Studies Panel Data Sets: 1990-91, 1991-92, 1990-92

	Democrats in Initial Panel Wave			Republicans in Initial Panel Wave		
	1990-91	1991-92	1990-92	1990-91	1991-92	1990-92
Independent variables						
Abortion attitude ₁₉₉₀	-0.06 (0.23)	-0.43** (0.25)	-0.38** (0.19)	-0.82 (0.49)	0.47** (0.26)	-0.01 (0.25)
Ideology _{t-1}	0.42** (0.24)	0.57*** (0.23)	0.48** (0.21)	-1.02** (0.41)	0.03 (0.25)	0.01 (0.27)
Strength partisanship _{t-1}	-3.48*** (0.96)	-1.37** (0.64)	-2.18*** (0.78)	-5.51** (3.22)	-2.81*** (1.10)	-3.01*** (1.01)
Retrospective sociotropic _{t-1}	-0.41 (0.31)	-0.48 (0.29)	-0.29 (0.29)	-1.21 (0.66)	0.82** (0.37)	0.20 (0.32)
Region _{t-1}	0.60 (0.70)	-0.35 (0.79)	0.68 (0.53)	-0.18 (1.33)	1.07* (0.71)	0.86 (0.71)
Gender	0.98** (0.49)	1.29** (0.56)	0.74* (0.47)	0.30 (0.78)	-1.05** (0.63)	-0.86** (0.52)
Age _{t-1}	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.22** (0.11)	-0.17** (0.09)
Age _{t-1} × age _{t-1}	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Education _{t-1}	-0.10 (0.59)	-0.90 (0.67)	-0.59 (0.56)	-0.24 (1.19)	0.92* (0.58)	0.76* (0.51)
Race	-0.61 (1.06)	—	-1.99** (1.08)	—	—	—
Constant	3.64 (2.96)	0.81 (2.11)	1.14 (2.35)	11.07 (5.70)	1.39 (2.35)	3.84* (2.45)
Number of observations	367	282	370	294	255	278
Log likelihood	-447.74	-365.71	-463.55	-311.19	-320.05	-340.42


Note: The dependent variables for the model Democrats in initial wave are coded 1 for individuals who identify with the Democratic party in the initial wave and identify with the Republican party in the subsequent wave and 0 for individuals who identify with the Democratic party in both waves. The dependent variables for the model Republicans in initial wave are coded 1 for individuals who identify with the Republican party in the initial wave and identify with the Democratic party in the subsequent wave and 0 for individuals who identify with the Republican party in both waves.

These estimates are obtained by using generalized linear covariate measurement error models (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2003) that specify measurement error variance of the lagged value of strength of partisanship at 0.299.

* $p < .075$, one-tailed. ** $p < .05$, one-tailed. *** $p < .01$, one-tailed.


Appendix 9c: Mean Probability that a Democrat became a Republican (Killian and Wilcox, 568).

Democrats Becoming Republicans in National Election Studies Panel



Appendix 10c: Probability of a Democrat Becoming a Republican (Killian and Wilcox, 570).


Democrats Becoming Republicans, 1982-97



Note: Baseline individual is pro-choice, liberal, weak Democrat, not from the South, female, without a college degree, and White.

Appendix 11c: Probability of a Republican Becoming a Democrat (Killian and Wilcox, 570).

Republicans Becoming Democrats, 1982-97



Note: Baseline individual is pro-life, conservative, weak Republican, not from the South, male, and without a college degree.

CROSSTABS FROM MY RESEARCH

1. Crosstab: Abortion Position self-placement, Party Identification, and Three Generations

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Abortion position: self-placement * Three Generations * R Party ID: 3 cats	1024	84.5%	188	15.5%	1212	100.0%

Abortion position: self-placement * Three Generations * R Party ID: 3 cats Crosstabulation

R Party ID: 3 cats				Three Generations			Total
				Before 1950	1950-1965	After 1965	
Democrat	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	15	13	10	38
			% within Three Generations	11.5%	15.1%	9.3%	11.7%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	48	13	27	88
			% within Three Generations	36.6%	15.1%	25.0%	27.1%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	20	15	16	51
			% within Three Generations	15.3%	17.4%	14.8%	15.7%
		4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	48	45	55	148
			% within Three Generations	36.6%	52.3%	50.9%	45.5%
Total			Count	131	86	108	325
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Independent	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	17	12	8	37
			% within Three Generations	14.2%	9.5%	5.6%	9.5%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	43	38	47	128
			% within Three Generations	35.8%	30.2%	33.1%	33.0%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	26	20	24	70
% within Three Generations	21.7%		15.9%	16.9%	18.0%		
4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	34	56	63	153		
	% within Three Generations	28.3%	44.4%	44.4%	39.4%		
Total			Count	120	126	142	388
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Republican	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	23	16	20	59
			% within Three Generations	19.3%	16.5%	21.1%	19.0%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	43	31	35	109
			% within Three Generations	36.1%	32.0%	36.8%	35.0%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	27	20	15	62
% within Three Generations	22.7%		20.6%	15.8%	19.9%		
4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	26	30	25	81		
	% within Three Generations	21.8%	30.9%	26.3%	26.0%		
Total			Count	119	97	95	311
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

2. Crosstab: Abortion position self-placement, South/Non-South, and 3 Generations

Non-South/South				Three Generations			Total
				Before 1950	1950-1965	After 1965	
Non-South	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	32	22	21	75
			% within Three Generations	14.1%	9.6%	9.2%	10.9%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	77	63	67	207
			% within Three Generations	33.9%	27.5%	29.3%	30.2%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	46	39	39	124
	% within Three Generations	20.3%	17.0%	17.0%	18.1%		
	4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	72	105	102	279	
		% within Three Generations	31.7%	45.9%	44.5%	40.7%	
Total			Count	227	229	229	685
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
South	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	24	20	18	62
			% within Three Generations	16.3%	23.8%	14.5%	17.5%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	59	21	44	124
			% within Three Generations	40.1%	25.0%	35.5%	34.9%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	27	16	17	60
	% within Three Generations	18.4%	19.0%	13.7%	16.9%		
	4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	37	27	45	109	
		% within Three Generations	25.2%	32.1%	36.3%	30.7%	
Total			Count	147	84	124	355
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3. Crosstab: Abortion position, Education, and 3 Generations

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Abortion position: self-placement * Three Generations * Educ: 3 cats	1040	85.8%	172	14.2%	1212	100.0%

Educ: 3 cats				Three Generations			Total
				Before 1950	1950-1965	After 1965	
<=HS	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	37	17	12	66
			% within Three Generations	20.8%	16.8%	10.3%	16.7%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	69	36	48	153
			% within Three Generations	38.8%	35.6%	41.4%	38.7%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	25	15	17	57
	% within Three Generations	14.0%	14.9%	14.7%	14.4%		
	4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	47	33	39	119	
	% within Three Generations	26.4%	32.7%	33.6%	30.1%		
	Total	Count	178	101	116	395	
	% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
Some coll	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	10	13	17	40
			% within Three Generations	11.4%	12.7%	12.1%	12.1%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	30	28	43	101
			% within Three Generations	34.1%	27.5%	30.7%	30.6%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	26	25	26	77
	% within Three Generations	29.5%	24.5%	18.6%	23.3%		
	4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	22	36	54	112	
	% within Three Generations	25.0%	35.3%	38.6%	33.9%		
	Total	Count	88	102	140	330	
	% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
>=Coll	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	9	12	10	31
			% within Three Generations	8.3%	10.9%	10.3%	9.8%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	37	20	20	77
			% within Three Generations	34.3%	18.2%	20.6%	24.4%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count	22	15	13	50
	% within Three Generations	20.4%	13.6%	13.4%	15.9%		
	4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	40	63	54	157	
	% within Three Generations	37.0%	57.3%	55.7%	49.8%		
	Total	Count	108	110	97	315	
	% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		

4. Crosstab: Importance of Abortion, Party ID, and 3 Generations

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Importance of abortion issue to R * Three Generations * R Party ID: 3 cats	1039	85.7%	173	14.3%	1212	100.0%

Importance of abortion issue to R * Three Generations * R Party ID: 3 cats Crosstabulation							
R Party ID: 3 cats				Three Generations			Total
				Before 1950	1950-1965	After 1965	
Democrat	Importance of abortion issue to R	1 Extremely important	Count	34	33	45	112
			% within Three Generations	25.8%	37.5%	41.7%	34.1%
		2 Very important	Count	47	22	30	99
			% within Three Generations	35.6%	25.0%	27.8%	30.2%
		3 Somewhat important	Count	41	26	24	91
			% within Three Generations	31.1%	29.5%	22.2%	27.7%
		4 Not too important	Count	8	6	8	22
			% within Three Generations	6.1%	6.8%	7.4%	6.7%
		5 Not at all important	Count	2	1	1	4
			% within Three Generations	1.5%	1.1%	.9%	1.2%
	Total		Count	132	88	108	328
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Independent	Importance of abortion issue to R	1 Extremely important	Count	34	36	41	111
			% within Three Generations	27.9%	28.1%	28.3%	28.1%
		2 Very important	Count	34	33	42	109
			% within Three Generations	27.9%	25.8%	29.0%	27.6%
		3 Somewhat important	Count	43	47	45	135
			% within Three Generations	35.2%	36.7%	31.0%	34.2%
		4 Not too important	Count	6	8	13	27
			% within Three Generations	4.9%	6.3%	9.0%	6.8%
		5 Not at all important	Count	5	4	4	13
			% within Three Generations	4.1%	3.1%	2.8%	3.3%
Total			Count	122	128	145	395
			% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Republican	Importance of abortion issue to R	1 Extremely important	Count	42	31	29	102
			% within Three Generations	34.4%	31.6%	30.2%	32.3%
		2 Very important	Count	39	28	37	104
			% within Three Generations	32.0%	28.6%	38.5%	32.9%
		3 Somewhat important	Count	32	31	21	84
			% within Three Generations	26.2%	31.6%	21.9%	26.6%
		4 Not too important	Count	8	7	9	24
			% within Three Generations	6.6%	7.1%	9.4%	7.6%

5 Not at all important	Count	1	1	0	2	
	% within Three Generations	.8%	1.0%	.0%	.6%	
Total		Count	122	98	96	316
		% within Three Generations	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

5. Crosstab: Abortion positions, Race (White/Black), and Party ID

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Abortion position: self-placement * Race: White / Black * R Party ID: 3 cats	911	75.2%	301	24.8%	1212	100.0%

CROSSTAB #5

Abortion position: self-placement * Race: White / Black * R Party ID: 3 cats Crosstabulation

R Party ID: 3 cats				Race: White / Black		Total
				1 White	2 Black	
Democrat	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	16	18	34
			% within Race: White / Black	8.4%	18.9%	11.9%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	50	26	76
			% within Race: White / Black	26.3%	27.4%	26.7%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons othr than rape	Count	29	16	45
			% within Race: White / Black	15.3%	16.8%	15.8%
		4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	95	35	130
			% within Race: White / Black	50.0%	36.8%	45.6%
	Total		Count	190	95	285
			% within Race: White / Black	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Independent	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	26	5	31
			% within Race: White / Black	9.3%	8.9%	9.2%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	86	24	110
			% within Race: White / Black	30.7%	42.9%	32.7%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons othr than rape	Count	52	10	62
			% within Race: White / Black	18.6%	17.9%	18.5%
		4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	116	17	133
			% within Race: White / Black	41.4%	30.4%	39.6%
	Total		Count	280	56	336
			% within Race: White / Black	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Republican	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	56	1	57
			% within Race: White / Black	19.5%	33.3%	19.7%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	97	1	98
			% within Race: White / Black	33.8%	33.3%	33.8%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons othr than rape	Count	58	0	58
			% within Race: White / Black	20.2%	.0%	20.0%
		4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	76	1	77
			% within Race: White / Black	26.5%	33.3%	26.6%
	Total		Count	287	3	290
			% within Race: White / Black	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

6. Crosstab: Abortion Position, Interested in following campaigns, and Party ID

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Abortion position: self-placement * Interested in following campaigns? * R Party ID: 3 cats	1031	85.1%	181	14.9%	1212	100.0%

Abortion position: self-placement * Interested in following campaigns? * R Party ID: 3 cats Crosstabulation

R Party ID: 3 cats				Interested in following campaigns?			Total
				1 Very much	3 Somewhat	5 Not much	
Democrat	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	15	16	7	38
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	10.7%	11.2%	16.7%	11.7%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	31	42	15	88
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	22.1%	29.4%	35.7%	27.1%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons othr than rape	Count	18	27	6	51
% within Interested in following campaigns?	12.9%		18.9%	14.3%	15.7%		
4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	76	58	14	148		
	% within Interested in following campaigns?	54.3%	40.6%	33.3%	45.5%		
Total			Count	140	143	42	325
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Independent	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	13	13	12	38
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	9.3%	7.1%	17.1%	9.7%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	41	60	27	128
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	29.3%	33.0%	38.6%	32.7%
		3 The law should permit abortion for reasons othr than rape	Count	24	36	10	70
% within Interested in following campaigns?	17.1%		19.8%	14.3%	17.9%		
4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count	62	73	21	156		
	% within Interested in following campaigns?	44.3%	40.1%	30.0%	39.8%		
Total			Count	140	182	70	392
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Republican	Abortion position: self-placement	1 By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	30	25	5	60
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	19.7%	19.2%	15.6%	19.1%
		2 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, inc	Count	55	43	12	110
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	36.2%	33.1%	37.5%	35.0%

	3 The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	27 17.8%	28 21.5%	8 25.0%	63 20.1%
	4 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abort	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	40 26.3%	34 26.2%	7 21.9%	81 25.8%
Total		Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	152 100.0%	130 100.0%	32 100.0%	314 100.0%

7. Crosstabs: Favor/Oppose Gov't funds for Abortion, Interest in Campaigns, 3 Generations

Case Processing Summary


	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Favor/oppose govt funds to pay for abortion * Interested in following campaigns? * R Party ID: 3 cats	1126	92.9%	86	7.1%	1212	100.0%

Favor/oppose govt funds to pay for abortion * Interested in following campaigns? * R Party ID: 3 cats Crosstabulation

R Party ID: 3 cats				Interested in following campaigns?			Total
				1 Very much	3 Somewhat	5 Not much	
Democrat	Favor/oppose govt funds to pay for abortion	1 Favor strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	51 32.5%	31 20.0%	9 18.8%	91 25.3%
		2 Favor not strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	43 27.4%	39 25.2%	10 20.8%	92 25.6%
		4 Oppose not strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	21 13.4%	18 11.6%	7 14.6%	46 12.8%
		5 Oppose strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	42 26.8%	67 43.2%	22 45.8%	131 36.4%
		Total	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	157 100.0%	155 100.0%	48 100.0%	360 100.0%
Independent	Favor/oppose govt funds to pay for abortion	1 Favor strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	39 25.5%	44 22.3%	8 9.6%	91 21.0%
		2 Favor not strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	26 17.0%	43 21.8%	24 28.9%	93 21.5%
		4 Oppose not strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	18 11.8%	34 17.3%	13 15.7%	65 15.0%
		5 Oppose strongly	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	70 45.8%	76 38.6%	38 45.8%	184 42.5%
		Total	Count % within Interested in following campaigns?	153 100.0%	197 100.0%	83 100.0%	433 100.0%

Republican	Favor/oppose govt funds to pay for abortion	1 Favor strongly	Count	10	18	4	32
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	6.2%	13.1%	11.8%	9.6%
		2 Favor not strongly	Count	16	20	7	43
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	9.9%	14.6%	20.6%	12.9%
		4 Oppose not strongly	Count	20	19	5	44
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	12.3%	13.9%	14.7%	13.2%
		5 Oppose strongly	Count	116	80	18	214
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	71.6%	58.4%	52.9%	64.3%
Total			Count	162	137	34	333
			% within Interested in following campaigns?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

8. Mean Feeling Thermometer: U.S. Supreme Court, Party ID



9. Crosstab: Correlation- Importance of abortion, Abortion position self-placement, Education 3 Categories

Correlations

		Importance of abortion issue to R	Abortion position: self-placement	Educ: 3 cats
Importance of abortion issue to R	Pearson Correlation	1	.135**	-.114**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
	N	1062	1047	1062
Abortion position: self-placement	Pearson Correlation	.135**	1	.183**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
	N	1047	1047	1047
Educ: 3 cats	Pearson Correlation	-.114**	.183**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
	N	1062	1047	1211

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

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